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Abstract 
Strong lending relationships between banks and small and medium-sized en-
terprises (SMEs) play a key role in the bank-based financial system of Germany. 
So far, they have been mainly described by the notion of a housebank and 
transactional features of long-term bank-customer relationships. The present 
paper takes a new look by considering also interactional variables which try to 
measure social relations between loan officer and firm manager. We find that 
these variables do affect loan pricing, but that their influence varies according to 
firm age and housebank status. 
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1. Introduction 
A financial system consists of institutional arrangements designed to transfer savings from 
those who generate them to those who are willing to make use of them. These arrangements 
are ultimately determined by legal rules, like the right of banks to own corporate shares or to 
be active both as lenders and underwriters on the capital market. They also affect bank prac-
tices and relationships between banks and borrowers which shape a financial system. A bank-
oriented system as prevalent in Germany is characterized by long-term relationships between 
banks and firms, going along with bank interests in firms and cross-selling activities of banks 
as the principal suppliers of credit. In contrast, the Anglo-Saxon market-based system shows a 
bias towards generating revenues from short-term or ”arms’ length lending” rather than long-
term relationship lending (see KELTNER 1995, p. 62).1 While short-term or volume-oriented 
lending is mainly characterized by transactional features of contract design or bargaining 
power (e.g. loan rates, collateralization, switching costs), long-term relationships are shaped 
by both transactions and interactions.  
Although there is growing evidence about long-term or housebank relationships between 
banks and borrowers, we know little about the role of social interactions in these relation-
ships. For the U.S., empirical studies on relationship lending focus on effects of the duration 
of the firm’s relationship with the bank or of the number of banks from which it borrows 
(BLACKWELL/WINTERS 1997, BERGER/UDELL 1995, PETERSEN/RAJAN 1994). For Germany, 
ELSAS/KRAHNEN (1998) and MACHAUER/WEBER (1998) additionally examined the role of the 
housebank status in the provision of loans to SMEs, where a housebank relationship is viewed 
as an information-intensive relationship with a long-term commitment. Besides the usually 
discussed transactional variables of relationship lending, HARHOFF and KÖRTING (1997)  ex-
amined also mutual trust as a proxy for social interactions between bankers and firm manag-
ers. Moreover, a case study suggests that in long-term lending relationships of German banks, 
credit assessment is more concerned with the behaviour of the borrowing firm’s insiders 
which provides information about the character, reliability and qualifications of the relevant 
persons, than with the investment programme of the debtor as such (BURGHOF/HENSCHEL 
1998). 
Given that Germany's financial system is the prototype of a bank-based system, further re-
search about the nature and role of its bank-borrower-relationships is particularly needed 
here.2 Since the early 1980s, all German banking groups have increasingly aspired the goal to 
provide SMEs comprehensive financial and business services, following the ”Allfinanz-
Strategie” or one shop-shopping strategy (see DEEG 1998). To compete more successfully in 
the SME market, banks seek stronger relationships with their clients by cross-selling.  
In the present paper, we postulate that loan rate differentials may not only be explained by the 
theory of financial intermediation and the related theory of relationship lending, but also by 
                                                 
1 Rather than working and growing with small- and medium sized firms, commercial banks use short-term loans 
to pursue pro-cyclical lending: in times of prosperity, when banks have excess capital at their disposal, they 
improve their interest offerings and in times of recession, they curtail their lending operations (Business Week, 
July 18, 1994 pp. 66-67). This explains why in the U.S., the performance of small firms is strongly correlated 
with the business cycle (GERTLER/GILCHRIST 1994). 
2 As to evidence about the effects on firms’ liquidity constraints see Fohlin (1998).   4
the theory of social interactions. Lending relationships are determined by both transactions 
and interactions between the contracting or bargaining partners. While transactional relation-
ships are rather anonymous, interactional relationships are shaped by social interactions be-
tween people,  i.e. loan officer on the one hand and firm manager on the other hand. We will 
analyze whether the impact of the interactional variables depends on the housebank-status or 
on firm age. Our hypotheses are tested with data from a recently concluded survey of German 
banks about their lending relationships to SMEs. 
The paper is organized as follows. In chapter 2, we formulate the hypotheses concerning loan 
rate determination which are derived from the theories of financial intermediation and rela-
tionship lending, combined with the interaction theory which has been used to analyze busi-
ness-to-business markets. Chapter 3 describes our empirical approach concerning data collec-
tion, measurement and descriptive statistics. In Chapter 4, we discuss the results and in chap-
ter 5, we draw conclusions. The regression results and some descriptive results are presented 
in the appendix. 
2. Loan Pricing and Lending Relationships: Theory and Hypotheses 
2.1 The Theory of Financial Intermediation 
The theory of financial intermediation suggests that asymmetric information and the resulting 
problems of moral hazard and adverse selection are the major impediments to the provision of 
credit to SMEs. In this regard, FAMA (1985) argues that commercial banks are unique finan-
cial intermediaries because they overcome information deficiencies by collecting inside or 
private information about the firms managers and projects. Given that the problems of asym-
metric information tend to be most acute in SMEs, banks specialize in information production 
and loan contract design to resolve credit rationing problems of these firms. Their compara-
tive advantage in tackling this task is the higher, the more they are able to reap economies of 
scale and scope in information production. The more the banks succeed in gathering informa-
tion about their customers, the better they are able to screen and monitor borrowers and the 
less they have to resort to indirect devices of setting loan contract terms (interest rates, collat-
eral requirements) to improve borrower incentives.3  
2.1.1 The Role of Firm Characteristics 
Since information gathering is costly, banks will expand their search for information only as 
long as its expected return exceeds its cost. This precludes that the first-best outcome of com-
plete information can be reached. If higher information asymmetry is compensated by a risk 
premium4, we expect that firms with high information asymmetry will have to pay higher 
loan rates. The degree of information asymmetry depends on borrower characteristics as firm 
size, firm age and firm governance or legal form. Typically, small firms provide less informa-
tion to outside financiers than large firms, because of fixed costs of information disclosure or 
                                                 
3 For surveys see SWANK (1996), THAKOR (1995), NEUBERGER (1994), (1998a). 
4 This compensation device has the draw-back that rising loan rates aggravate moral hazard and adverse selec-
tion problems, so that the supply curve of loans may bend backwards. However, the more information a bank 
has gained, the more it is able to rise loan rates, because its loan offer curve is less likely to bend backwards.   5
the absence of disclosure rules. Moreover, the lack of reputation constrains small firm bor-
rowing (see MARTINELLI 1997). With respect to loan pricing, we obtain the hypothesis 
H1:  Small firms have to pay higher loan rates than larger firms. 
Moreover, the information asymmetry decreases with growing age, because older firms may 
build up reputation by tracing a good credit history. This leads to  
H2:  Young firms have to pay higher loan rates than older firms. 
Firm governance as measured by the legal form is important because it affects the amount of 
private information that the firm managers have and their incentives and ability to shift risk to 
the bank and other fixed-claim holders. As limited liability restricts the bank’s access to pri-
vate assets of the owners in the event of distress, credit risk tends to be higher in corporations 
than in unincorporated firms (ELSAS/KRAHNEN 1998). Moreover, partnerships and proprietor-
ships where the owners are liable for the firm’s debt with their whole private property should 
be less prone to moral hazard, and their managers have higher incentives to prevent bank-
ruptcy. They hold more personal stakes in their firms which are often their only source of in-
come (HAX 1990, p. 116). Thus, we expect 
H3:  Incorporated firms have to pay higher loan rates than unincorporated firms. 
2.1.2 The Role of Collateral 
The role of collateral in loan contracts may be explained by positive incentive and signaling 
effects which help resolve moral hazard and adverse selection problems under asymmetric 
information.5 If a loan is secured by a specific asset (inside or outside the firm) that serves as 
collateral, the lender has first claim to that asset in the event of default. First, this tends to de-
ter the borrower’s incentive to choose a riskier project after obtaining the loan. Second, col-
lateralization may induce a borrower to reveal its otherwise hidden risks. If there are two in-
distinguishable borrowers with different risk and the bank offers a secured loan with a low 
interest rate and an unsecured loan with a higher interest rate, a borrower’s willingness to ac-
cept the collateralized loan contract will be inversely related to its default risk on the loan.6 
This leads to the hypothesis 
H4:  Collateralization reduces loan rates by resolving asymmetric information problems.  
This theory of collateralization is based on the assumption that the bank cannot dinstiguish 
between borrowers of different risk. In practice, however, banks classify borrowers in risk 
classes on the basis of their observations. If a firm which is able to provide collateral is per-
ceived as less risky than a firm without collateral, it may obtain a better credit rating. If a 
lower observable risk implies a lower risk premium, we expect that collateralization reduces 
loan rates by lowering observable risk. 
On the other hand, more information about the creditworthiness of a borrower may be a sub-
stitute for higher loan rates and collateral requirements. Then both loan contract devices 
                                                 
5 For an explanation under symmetric information see NEUBERGER (1995). 
6 For surveys see GREENBAUM/THAKOR 1995, pp. 229; HARTMANN-WENDELS et al. 1998, pp. 171; NEUBERGER 
1998b.   6
should move into the same direction and we should expect a positive correlation between col-
lateral and loan rate.  
2.1.3  The Role of Credit Use 
The risk of a bank credit depends on the project in which it is invested and on the bank’s abil-
ity to monitor credit use. It is the lower, the higher the marketability of the collateralized asset 
in the event of default and the lower are the costs of monitoring credit use. If the credit is used 
for specific purposes as capital expansion, replacement investments or investments in new 
plant and equipment, the monitoring costs are low, but the marketability of the assets declines 
as asset specifity increases. On the other hand, an unspecific credit use (e.g. credit line) im-
plies higher monitoring costs and, in the absence of a tangible collateral, higher credit risk. In 
the first case, the bank may reduce the exogenous risk by portfolio diversification, whereas in 
the second case, it faces an endogenous, undiversifiable risk of moral hazard. This implies 
H5:  Banks demand a higher risk premium on unspecific credits than on  credits with a spe-
cific use.   
2.2  The Theory of Relationship Lending 
2.2.1  The Transaction-Based View 
The cost of gathering information about the creditworthiness of a borrower may be prohibi-
tively high if borrower and lender transact only once, but can be reduced when the bank has 
more time to learn about the characteristics and actions of its customer in repeated transac-
tions. The reusability of information creates economies of scale in the technology of informa-
tion production: information which has been acquired during a lending relationship can be 
reused in future credit decisions, lowering the costs of lending (see BHATTACHARYA/THAKOR 
1993, THAKOR 1995). Economies of scope may be achieved, if the relationship with the cus-
tomer encompasses lending so that the bank can resort to information gathered in other trans-
actions, e.g. deposit accounts (see PETERSEN/RAJAN 1994). Hence, the gains from relationship 
lending are the higher, the more intense or the broader is the relationship. 
Moreover, relationship lending may be explained as an efficient arrangement in a world of 
incomplete contracts. By providing private information over a longer time period, it offers a 
technology for a valuable commitment by the lender vis-à-vis the borrower or for low cost 
renegotiations of debt contracts. As a result, loan rates should be lower or credit rationing 
should decrease (see ELSAS/KRAHNEN 1998). 
In the relationship lending literature, the intensity of the relationship has been measured by 
two variables: the duration of the relationship and the status of a housebank (PETER-
SEN/RAJAN 1994, BERGER/UDELL 1995, ELSAS/KRAHNEN 1998, HARHOFF/KÖRTING 1997). 
The duration is expected to affect the bank’s stock of private information. If a bank learns 
about firm quality over time, it may improve contract terms after having gained proof that 
investment projects have been successful. This leads to the hypothesis: 
H6:  As the duration of the lending relationship increases, loan rates will be lowered due to 
positive informations about the borrower’s quality.  
On the other hand, long-term relationships to borrowers may enable a bank to conduct com-
pensatory pricing. At the beginning of a relationship it demands the same price from all bor-  7
rowers. This price is lower than the price related to expected average quality in order to avoid 
an increase in risk by adverse incentive and adverse selection effects. Having lent to borrow-
ers of different risk, the bank will incur losses, when the bad borrowers go bankrupt at the 
beginning of their lending relationships. These losses may then be compensated, if the bank is 
able to bind the remaining good borrowers and raise loan rates above the level for high quality 
borrowers in a short-term transaction (HARTMANN-WENDELS et al. 1998, pp. 174).  
The ability of the bank to achieve such a binding depends on its bargaining power vis-a-vis 
the borrower, which is also affected by information production in a long-term relationship. If 
the bank is the borrower’s sole long-term financier, it obtains an information monopoly which 
provides a competitive advantage vis-à-vis outside banks (see FISCHER 1990; SHARPE 1990). 
Thus we obtain  
H7:  As the duration of the lending relationship increases, loan rates will be raised due to an 
information monopoly. 
An information monopoly is often related to the status of a housebank. ”...a housebank is re-
garded as the premier lender of a firm, being equipped with more relevant, and more timely 
information than any ‘normal’, nonhousebank institution” (ELSAS/KRAHNEN 1998, p. 2). This 
leads to a hold-up situation, where the housebank may extract a rent from its ex-post superior 
bargaining power:  
H8:   By gaining an information monopoly, housebanks set higher loan rates than normal 
banks as the duration of the relationship increases. 
A borrower should be willing to bear these extra costs of lending only if he also expects gains 
from a housebank relationship. In the theoretical literature on housebanking, these gains are 
explained by an intertemporal implicit contract: housebanks offer insurance-like services to 
their borrowers, bearing a special responsibility or lowering loan rates in the event of finan-
cial distress (EDWARDS/FISCHER 1994, pp. 8; for a survey see ELSAS/KRAHNEN 1998). Thus, 
we expect 
H9:  For  potentially distressed firms or firms with higher credit risk (measured by firm 
size, firm age, credit use), housebanks demand lower loan rates than normal banks. 
ELSAS and KRAHNEN (1998) did not find evidence for intra- or intertemporal price differentia-
tion related to housebanking. They concluded that housebanks might resort to another, indi-
rect device to be compensated for their higher monitoring efforts: selling additional financial 
products to their borrowers at unfavorable rates (cross selling). This leads to the hypothesis 
H10:   Housebanks resort more to cross-selling than normal banks to be compensated for 
their higher monitoring efforts instead of raising loan rates. 
2.2.2 The Interaction-Based View 
The relationship of a housebank to its customer is not only determined by the information 
effects of repeated transactions, but also by social interactions between the bargaining part-
ners. To describe these interactions, we compare the housebank relationship with a typical 
customer-supplier relationship of industrial firms. If housebanks are viewed as buyers of risk-
bearing investments in SME loans, both relationships have in common: 
•  the suppliers are mostly smaller than the buyers (see LEHMANN 1996);   8
•  because of their high turnover share, the buyers are key customers; 
•  by making specific advance deliveries or payments, the buyers obtain monopoly power 
which they may use to the detriment of the suppliers; 
•  information asymmetry between buyer and supplier implies a hold-up problem. 
Hence, by holding a large share of the information-intensive loans available from an SME, the 
housebank takes the role of a key customer of that firm.7  For the industrial sector, key cus-
tomer relationships have been analyzed under transactional as well as interactional aspects 
(LEHMANN 1996). The interactional view of business relationships is based on the interaction 
theory, which considers that on both sides of a relationship, people are actively involved (for 
a detailed and actual discussion see FORD 1997 and AXELSSOHN/EASTON 1992).  
While the term ‘relationship’ implies social relations or interactions, the relationship lending 
literature has neglected these aspects so far, focussing on the duration of a relationship as a 
means to reduce problems of asymmetric information (see HARTMANN-WENDELS et a. 1998, 
p. 174). Compared to goods markets, the social interactions between the managers of banks 
and SMEs are less clear and highly variable. PERRIEN and RICARD (1995, p. 40) conclude: 
”they (the bank managers) differ in their perceptions of the relationship orientation of both 
their own bank and competitors.” Concepts as trust, positive experience or obligation to a 
partner which are used to describe social interactions, are subjective and difficult to opera-
tionalize. 
If we resort to the interaction theory, it assumes that two interacting partners trade off the 
gains against the costs of interacting. They will continue the interaction only if, based on their 
experience, they feel that their contributions are adequately valued and paid for. Since rela-
tionships between borrowers and lenders tend to be conflicting (e.g. moral hazard, different 
wishes concerning collateral or flexibility of contract terms), the cognitive perceptions of both 
partners about the value of the relationship should play a large role. 
In the recent past, several studies have tried to develop a theoretical framework for the deter-
minants of a successful long-term relationship (see PERRIEN/RICARD 1995). One finding is 
that trust, confidence and satisfaction play the key role in the development of a relationship 
(see GANESAN 1994). ENNEW and BINKS (1995) find out that the nature of the relationship 
between banks and firms affect the extent to which firms feel constrained. Trust is an inter-
subjective phenomenon and, like reputation, it may be created through positive experience in 
the past. Trust leads to decreasing control costs by lowering moral hazard. In a dyadic rela-
tionship, lower monitoring costs may lead to lower markups. Therefore, our hypothesis is: 
H11:  Lending Relationships which are characterized by mutual trust and positive experience 
imply lower loan rates.  
Although perfect information is an unobtainable goal, the quantity and quality of information 
available to a bank will be influenced by the nature of its relationship with its business part-
ner. A close relationship has the potential to provide the bank with a better understanding of 
the operating environment facing a particular business. Banks can get a clearer picture of the 
                                                 
7 There is, however, an important difference between buyer-supplier relationships in the industrial sector and the 
retail (small business) banking sector: in the latter, vertical integration is ruled out.   9
managerial attributes and a more accurate overview of the business prospects. Thus, from the 
perspective of the bank, the relationship provides the basis for understanding customer needs 
and resources. In a good banking relationship, the flow of information is such that both parties 
will have a better understanding of each other (ENNEW/BINKS 1995). A closer relationship, 
and consequently more accurate information exchange, would ceteris paribus decrease moni-
toring costs and ultimately loan rates. Specifically, we state our hypothesis as: 
H12:  Lending relationships which are characterized by a rich information flow from the 
borrower to the bank imply lower loan rates.  
A major issue in relationship lending is the return on investing in relationships with custom-
ers. KOLARI, BERNEY and OU (1996) find empirical evidence that while small business loans 
likely have a negligible effect on the profits of large banks, they tend to increase the profit-
ability of small banks over time - holding constant various bank risk characteristics. An effec-
tive banking relationship is not a simple one way process and requires a positive contribution 
from both partners. The bank can only meet customer needs if the manager or owner of the 
SME provides it appropriate and timely information. This cooperation ends up in a stable 
relationship, where the partners feel obliged to each other. This leads to the following 
hypotheses: 
                                                
H13:  A stable relationship between bank and borrower implies a lower loan rate 
and 
H14:  If the bank feels obliged to its customer, it provides loans at lower prices.  
Furthermore, we will postulate:  
H15:   In housebank relationships social interactions play a larger role than in non-housebank 
relationships.  
3. Data Collection, Measurement and Expected Signs 
3.1 Data Collection and Measurement 
For our empirical analysis, we use data obtained from a survey of German banks in 1997. 
Approximately 1200 questionnaires were mailed to banks in towns with a location of a state-
owned savings bank (Sparkasse). In those towns, we sent the questionnaire to the wholesales 
managers of three different bank types: big private banks8, state-owned savings banks and 
cooperative banks (Genossenschaftsbanken). The respondents were asked to refer to loan ap-
plications of SMEs with a loan volume ranging between DM 100.000 and 10 millions. We 
obtained 395 complete responses which implies a response rate of 32.5 percent. From the total 
of 395 cases, we analysed only those which refer to appropriated loans. Our dataset thus com-
prises 357 cases. 
Apart from questions about firm characteristics (firm size, firm age, legal form) and contract 
terms (interest rate, collateral, repayment terms), we asked for the type of credit use (capital 
expansion, replacement investment, investments in new plant and equipment, credit lines, no 
 
8 Including the Deutsche Bank, the Dresdner Bank, the Commerzbank, and the now merged Bayerische Ver-
einsbank and the Bayerische Hypotheken und Wechsel-Bank.    10
special use). As ELSAS/KRAHNEN (1998) and MACHAUER/WEBER (1998), we also asked for 
the bank-internal credit rating of borrowers. Moreover, the questionnaire contained a variety 
of questions related to the methods and costs of information gathering and the nature of the 
relationship between banks and their small and medium-sized borrowers.  
Specific aspects of the bank-borrower relationship were measured using a set of multi-item 
scales. The respondents were asked to indicate their  perceptions about these aspects on a 
range of statements scored on a 5-point Likert scale.  
 To operationalize the social aspects of the lending relationship, we followed the interaction 
approaches to business-to-business relationships (see CAMPBELL 1985). As interaction vari-
ables, we chose ‘control and distrust’, ‘positive experience in the past’, ‘obligation to the 
partner’, ‘willingness of the borrower to inform about problems’, and ‘stability of the rela-
tionship’. Obviously, these aspects are interdependent (see also ENNEWS/BINKS 1995).  
To measure the borrower’s willingness to provide information, we used a 5-point scale which 
takes the value 3, if the willingness is perceived as neither better nor worse than that of other 
borrowing firms and the value 5 (1), if the willingness is perceived as remarkably better 
(worse) than the average. In the same manner, we compared the costs of loan processing and 
the economic and technical competence of the borrower’s management as perceived by the 
bank. These variables were ranked on a 5-point-scale which takes the value 1 (5), if the re-
spondent chooses the judgement ”very low” (”very high”).  
To avoid ordinal variables, we transformed them into dummy variables: for each 5-point-
scaled ordinal variable, all values below the median are proxied by the value zero and all val-
ues at or above the median by the value 1. The same procedure was applied to the measure-
ment of the housebank status. The bankers had to evaluate on a 5-point-scale whether they 
perceive their bank as the customer’s housebank (1 = does not apply; 5 = applies completely).  
To avoid an industry bias in the measurement of firm size9, we computed the median of sales 
volume for each industry and transformed the size variable into a dummy variable.  
The grouping of firms into age categories follows the classification as usually practiced by 
banks: young firms of age less than 2 years, middle-aged firms of age between 2 and 6 years 
and old firms of age 7-10 years or more than 10 years. This classification provides a kind of 
signal about credit risk. As shown by the time-series study of BRÜDERL and PREISENDÖRFER 
(1998), firms in the age class 2-6 years carry the highest bankruptcy risk, whereas a long-term 
success cannot be expected before 7 years after birth. For the youngest firms with less than 2 
years of age bankruptcy risk tends to be low, because they can often resort to government aid 
or to own reserves built up in the start-up phase. 
Similarly, we grouped the duration of the lending relationship in the following way: new cus-
tomer (first contract), young relationship with a duration less than 2 years, duration according 
to the ‘problem age class’ of 2-6 years and old relationship with longer duration. 
                                                 
9 E.g. the minimum efficient size related to sales volume is higher in the trade sector than in the services sector.   11
We include four control variables: (1) bank type to control for differences between banking 
groups10, (2)  management skill of the borrower as perceived by the bank, (3) industry dum-
mies and (4) regional dummies.  
The regional dummies shall capture differences in credit risk between the ”new” and the ”old” 
German states. Given that the transformation of the former communist system of the German 
Democratic Republic to a market economy is not yet concluded, the location of a firm in the 
‘new’ states implies higher information asymmetries and managerial deficiencies than when it 
is located in the ‘old’ states of West Germany. 
All variables which are included in the estimations are described in table 1.  
3.2. Expected  Signs 
Table 2 shows the expected signs for all cases. Furthermore, there should be differences be-
tween the loan pricing of housebanks and non-housebanks. If we expect that a variable exerts 
more (less) influence in the housebank subsample than in the non-housebank subsample, we 
will remark this difference as strong (weak). 
                                                 
10 We distinguish between the big private banks on the one hand and the savings banks and cooperative banks 
on the other hand,  because the last two have in common a decentralized organizational structure, as opposed 
to the centralized structure of the big private banks (see VITOLS 1998).   12
Table 1 
Definition and Measurement of Variables 
  Variable  Explanation and Measurement 
Dependent  Interest rate  measured as percentage points above the refinancing interest rate
Firm Characteristics  Age  dummy variable indicating whether the firm is less than 2 years, 
2 - 6 years, 7 - 10 years or more than 10 years old 
  Firm size  dummy variable indicating whether the firm size is above the 
median size in that industry. Firm size was measured by turn-
over-size categories. 
  Incorporated  firm  dummy variable indicating whether the firm is incorporated 
(limited liability company, GmbH or stock corporation, AG) or 
not (KG, OHG, BGR) 
Relationship Vari-
ables 
Experience*  ”We made positive experience in the past” 
  Obligation*  ”We are obliged  to the borrower” 
  Information*  ”The borrower informs us immediately about problems” 
 Stability*  ”Our  relationship  is stable under pressure” 
  Mutual trust*  ”Our relationship is dominated by trust instead of control and 
distrust” 
Transaction variables  Repayment flexibility*  ”The repayment terms are very flexible for the client” 
  Credit use   dummy variable, indicating the type of credit use: investment in 
new plant and equipment, capital expansion, replacement in-
vestment, no special use, credit line 
  Collateral  measured as percentage points  
  Credit rating  qualitative variable, indicating the credit rating, ranging from  1 
(=best rating) to 5 (=worst rating).11
  Durating of loan proc-
essing 
measured in days 
  Cost of loan processing* dummy variable, indicating whether the costs of loan processing 
are above the median (1) or not (0). The median was computed 
from 5 classes, ranging from 1 (=below average) to 5 (=above 
average). 
  Duration of the relation-
ship 
dummy variable indicating to which class the duration of the 
relationship belongs (new client, less than 2 years, 2 - 6 years, 7 - 
10 years, more than 10 years) 
  Cross-selling  dummy variable indicating whether cross-selling aspects played 
a role in lending 
Control variables  Bank type  dummy variable indicating whether the bank belongs to the big 
private banks or not 
  Management skill*  ”The management skill/competence  is ... under the average (1) 
.... over the average (5)” 
  Industry  Set of dummy variables indicating to which industry the firm 
belongs to (manufacturing and production; trade, service, build-
ing and construction; others) 
  West German firm  dummy variable indicating whether the firm is located in West 
Germany (old states of Germany) 
•  qualitative variable, measured by a Likert scale, based on answers ranging from 1 (=not at 
all) to 5 (=to a very large extent). In the OLS-regression, we transformed the qualitative vari-
able into a dummy variable, indicating whether its value is below median (0) or not (1).  
                                                 
11 See ALTMAN/SAUNDERS (1997).   
Table 2 
Variables and Hypotheses about their Influence on the Loan Rate 
  Variable       Hypothesis 
All cases              Housebank versus 
                             Non-Housebank 
Firm Characteristics  Firm size  negative  (H1)  weak  (H9) 
  Age  negative  (H2)  weak  (H9) 
  Incorporated firm  positive   (H3)   
Credit  use  Specific use (New, Ex-
pansion, Replace) 
Unspecific use 
negative  (H5) 
 
positive   (H5) 
weak  (H9) 
 
weak  (H9) 
Interaction Variables  Mutual trust  negative  (H11)  strong (H15) 
  Experience  negative  (H11)  strong (H15) 
  Obligation  negative  (H14)  strong (H15) 
  Information  negative  (H12)  strong (H15) 
  Stability  negative  (H13)  strong (H15) 
Transaction variables  Collateral  negative  (H4)   
  Credit rating  positive  weak (H9) 
 Repayment  flexibility  positive   
  Duration of loan process-
ing 
positive  
  Cost of loan processing  positive   
  Duration of the relation-
ship 
negative  (H6) 
positive   (H7) 
  
strong (H8) 
 Cross-selling  negative  strong  (H10) 
Control variables  Bank type  neutral   
 Management  skill  negative   
  West German firm  negative  weak  (H9) 
 Industry    neutral   
4.   Estimations and Results 
4.1 Specifications 
To measure the influence of transaction and interaction variables on the loan rate, we use sev-
eral multivariate specifications. As shown in table 3, all specifications include firm-specific 
variables, credit rating and collatera-lization (no loan is granted without credit rating and col-
lateral) and the control variables defined above. The first specification (simple model) shows 
the influence of these variables on the loan rate. The second specification (transaction model) 
includes also transaction variables and the third specification (total cases or interaction model) 
also interaction variables (including housebanking). Since we expect that the latter are more 
relevant in a housebank relationship than in a 'normal' lending relation-ship, we further differ-
entiate between the housebank and non-housebank subsamples (table 4). Moreover, we expect 
that the age of the borrowing firm plays an important role in lending decisions. Interviews 
with loan officers indicated that there is no linear relationship between firm age and lending 
or loan pricing, where the firms are grouped in age classes. Therefore, we also tested differ-
ences between the subsamples of different age classes (table 5). 
4.2. Empirical Results and Discussions 
Firm Characteristic  
As expected, there is a negative correlation between firm size and loan rate. This result, which 
has also been found in other empirical studies (e.g. Harhoff/Körting 1997), indicates that the  
banks use firm size as a proxy for credit risk. This is corroborated by our results for different 
age groups (table 5). The negative impact of firm size is significant in the group of the young-
est firms (< 2 years), where the information asymmetry is largest, whereas it is insignificant in 
the group of 2-6 year old firms. That it is again significant in the group of older (7-10 years 
old) firms, may be explained by their higher bargaining power rather than by a risk premium. 
As found by COWLING and SUDGAN (1995, p. 94), banks exert monopoly power in small firm 
financing. In this respect, our findings are different. As shown in table 4, firm size plays no 
significant role in housebanking relationships, where monopoly power should be highest this 
supports H9. For non-housebank relationships the negative influence of firm size is stronger, 
although not highly significant. 
The legal form of the firm shows the influence according to H3 for all specifications. An in-
corporated firm with limited liability involves a higher credit risk for the bank than an unin-
corporated firm that provides unlimited access to private assets of the proprietors. The risk 
premium for limited liability is highest in the group of the youngest firms, where the legal 
form provides a signal to evaluate credit risk (see table 5). In this age group, the coefficient of 
the legal form is not only absolutely highest, but also significantly different from zero (at the 
89% value), which is not the case in the other age groups. Obviously, with growing age, the 
legal form becomes less important to signal credit risk. 
Our results indicate that the influence of firm age on loan pricing is not linear. In the group of 
the youngest firms, the banks compete intensively for new customers. Here, price competition 
leads to lower interest rates (see e.g. AUSTERBERRY et al. 1997). This negative effect seems to 
compensate a higher risk premium. However, the risk is not likely to be very high in this age 
class. Young firms are often backed by government guaranties or other collateral at the begin-
ning of their lives. Moreover, our sample contains only data on appropriated loans and hence 
excludes the highest risks.  
The highest interest rates are paid by firms which are 2 to 6 years old (see table 3). This age 
class shows the highest insolvency rate of German firms (see BRÜDERL/PREISENDÖRFER 
1998), which explains a high risk premium. Moreover, the banks may extract rents from their 
higher bargaining power towards these firms. However, as indicated by table 4, this does not 
apply to housebanks, which are most likely to gain from a hold-up situation. Non-housebanks 
demand significantly higher loan rates from their 2-6 year old customers. As shown in tables 
4 and 5, the role of the housebank is highest in this age group12 and manifests itself in lower 
loan rates, as theoretically expected (see H9). Housebanks seem to provide liquidity insurance 
over the life cycle of a firm, demanding the lowest loan rates when the insolvency risk is 
highest. In contrast, a 'normal' bank demands the highest loan rate in the high-risk age class. 
With increasing age, the probability that the firm survives increases, lowering the banks' 
credit risk. Moreover, growing skill of managers (see tables 3 and 5) and larger firm size re-
duce a firm's switching costs, which explains lower loan rates for the oldest firms.  
                                                 
12 Note that the fourth age class of firms older than 10 years have not been included into the regression analysis 
to avoid absolute multicollinearity. Its influence is included in the coefficient of the constant. We chose the 
first three age classes to obtain a clear ranking.  
Credit Use 
All regressions support hypothesis H5, indicating that unspecific loans or credit lines have to 
pay significantly higher interest rates than loans with a specific use. There are, however, dif-
ferences depending on the housebank status and firm age, which supports H9 (see tables 3, 4, 
5). Non-housebanks demand an almost significantly (p = 0.1515)13 higher premium on loans 
without specified use and hence higher endogenous credit risk (see table 4)14. This may be 
due to a negative signal: if a firem applies for such a credit at a bank which is not its house-
bank, that bank should interpret this as an unfavorable signal about the firm’s quality. Be-
cause of their higher monitoring efforts, housebanks reduce the risk of unspecified loans and 
reject loans that are too risky. 
Interaction Variables 
Although social interactions between the bargaining partners seem to be of less importance in 
small business lending than in the components supplying industry, aspects such as mutual 
trust and positive experience do play a role. The mutual trust variable shows the expected 
negative influence (see H11), which is significant only in housebank relationships (H15). 
Hence, the creation of trust leads to lower loan rates for housebank customers. Also positive 
experience from the past exerts a negative influence on loan prices (H11), which is, however, 
not significant. If the bank feels obliged to its customer, loan rates rise. Although this rise is 
insignificant, it may indicate that ‚obligations‘ does not express a cooperative attitude (ac-
cording ot H14), but rather that banks demand a compensation for their commitments to cus-
tomers (see ELSAS/KRAHNEN 1998). This applies most to the group of the 2-6 year old firms 
(see table 5), where the t-value is almost significant (p = 1.556). 
The willingness of the borrower to inform its bank immediately about problems exerts always 
a positive influence on the loan rate, which is significant for the group of the 2-6 year old 
firms and for housebanking relationships. This result cannot be explained by a higher coop-
eration from the side of the borrower, but rather by the expectation of financial distress when 
problems are reported (see also HARHOFF/KÖRTING 1997). Hence, housebanks do not seem to 
smooth loan rates as credit risk deteriorates, which has also been found in the times-series 
studies of ELSAS/KRAHNEN (1998) and MACHAUER/WEBER (1998). 
A higher stability of the lending relationship leads to the expected reduction of loan rates 
(H13), which is significant for all cases (see table 3). In this regard, we find no significant 
difference between housebank and non-housebank relationships (see table 4). The results re-
ported in table 5 indicate that the stability of the relationship is rather related to firm age. It 
shows only a significant influence in the first 10 years of a firm's life, but not if the firm is 
older than 10 years. This is consistent with our conjecture that the oldest firms face lower 
switching costs and have higher bargaining power which they use to reduce interest rates. 
Moreover, they are more likely affected by successor problems which impair the stability of a 
lending relationship. In the next decade, more than half a million SMEs in Germany will need 
a new generation of leaders (DEEG 1998, p. 96). 
                                                 
13 p represents the level of significance, i.e. the probability of false rejection of the null hypothesis. Since the 
tables contain only levels of p < 0.10, we indicate the higher level here. 
14 Here, a chi square test shows a highly significant difference between housebanks and non-housebanks (see 
table 8).  
Compared with the transaction model (see table 3), the inclusion of the interaction variables 
increases the explained dispersion and lowers the coefficient of the constant. As expected 
(H15), the influence of these variables tends to be stronger in housebanking relationships and 
in lending relationships with young, less than 10 year old firms. 
Transaction Variables 
We find a significant impact of credit rating on loan pricing according to the hypothesis of a 
risk-premium, which is consistent with other empirical studies (e.g. ELSAS/KRAHNEN 1998, 
MACHAUER/WEBER 1998). Collatera-lization shows the expected negative influence (H4), 
which is significant for the specifications of table 3 (for an opposing result see MACHAUER/ 
WEBER 1998). Housebanks obtain more collateral than non-housebanks (see table 7). Since 
they tend to be the first lenders of a firm, they are more likely to get the best collateral and 
have a comparative advantage in evaluating those assets of the borrower that are suitable for 
collatera-lization (see also MACHAUER/WEBER 1998). If the same firm applies for a credit at 
another bank, it may not be able to provide collateral of the same quality or to the same ex-
tent. This might explain why an increase in collateral is of higher value for non-housebanks, 
leading to a significant loan rate reduction only there (see table 4). 
Also the repayment terms have a significant influence on loan pricing, more flexible terms 
being compensated by higher loan rates (see table 3). This applies especially to housebanks, 
which seem to use their monopoly power in this regard (see table 4). It applies also to all 
firms which are younger than 10 years, but not to the older firms. In this age group, the loan 
rate is raised less and insignificantly, when the bank offers more flexible repayment terms. 
This result can again be explained by the higher bargaining power of older firms. 
The duration of loan processing shows no significant influence in all specifications, whereas 
the loan rate increases as expected, if the cost of loan processing is above average. Cross-
selling activities have a negative influence on the loan rate, which is, however, only signifi-
cant in non-housebank relationships. Thus, the hypothesis that housebanks use cross-selling to 
be compensated for their special services (H10) is not supported by our data. Rather, non-
housebanks may use cross-selling to be compensated for obtaining less collateral. 
According to the theory of relationship lending, the duration of the relationship should be an 
important determinant of loan pricing. The hypothesis that the loan rate declines because the 
costs of information production become lower as the duration of the lending relationship in-
creases, is not supported by our regressions. Since this finding corresponds with that of HAR-
HOFF/KÖRTING (1997) and MACHAUER/WEBER (1998), it does not seem to be an anomaly or 
to be caused by inconsistencies in the data.  
Control Variables 
As HARHOFF and KÖRTING (1997), we find a significant influence of the regional dummy, 
which indicates that firms located in the new states of Germany have to pay higher loan rates 
than the firms in the old states to compensate the banks for the higher credit risk in the new 
states (for details see LINDNER-LEHMANN et al. 1998). For housebank relationships, the sig-
nificance of this influence vanishes supporting H9 (see table 4). The coefficients of the indus-
try dummies show different signs depending on the model specification and are not signifi-
cant. Also the banking type does not play a significant role. A significant influence is exerted 
from the variable management skill. Banks which perceive the management skill of their cus-
tomer as above average demand lower loan rates from these firms. This may be due to lower  
credit risk, but also to a higher bargaining power of the competent managers. Table 4 indi-
cates that this control variable plays a significant role only in housebanking relationships, 
maybe because housebanks gather more information about their borrowers than 'normal' 
banks.  
5. Conclusions  
We have postulated that a lending relationship depends on transactions as well as interactions 
between the bargaining partners. An empirical analysis of bank lending to small and medium-
sized firms in Germany has shown that loan prices are not only influenced by firm character-
istics and credit risk variables, but also by the social interactions between loan officer and 
bank manager. They vary significantly according to firm age and the status of a housebank. 
The relationship between firm age and loan prices is not linear and depends on age classes.  
Housebanks seem to provide loan rate smoothing over the life cycle of a firm, demanding 
significantly lower loan rates from firms of the age class 2-6 years, when insolvency risk is 
highest. Interactional variables as mutual trust and obligation play a larger role in housebank 
relationships than in ‘normal’ lending relationships. To be compensated for their special ser-
vices, housebanks use loan pricing more than cross-selling. For non-housebanks, on the other 
hand, cross-selling seems to be important as a compensation for less collateral. Like HAR-
HOFF/KÖRTING (1997) and MACHAUER/WEBER (1998), we cannot support the theoretical hy-
pothesis that loan rates depend on the duration of the lending relationship. 
Unlike the relationships between suppliers and buyers in the industrial sector, the relation-
ships between banks and their customers in small business lending have not been sufficiently 
analyzed yet. Although we have tried to go a step further, the present study is incomplete and 
contains open questions. For example, it does not consider possible interdependencies be-
tween the regression variables. Moreover, it neglects credit availability as an important vari-
able of SME financing. Also, there are more social dimensions of the lending relationship 
than trust, obligation, experience and stability which could be examined as determinants of 
lending. These are tasks for future research.   
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Appendix 
Table 3 
Determinants of Loan Pricing: The Influence of Transactions and Interactions 
Dependent Variable: Interest rate 
OLS Regression Coefficients (t-Value) 
  Simple Model  Transaction Model  Total Cases 
Firm Characteristics:       
Age:  < 2 years  +0,138794 (0,704)  +0,250510 (1,098)  +0,257492 (1,073) 
  2 - 6 years  +0,400753 (2,483)**  +0,339885 (1,684)*  +0,371031 (1,725)* 
  7 - 10 years  +0,268472 (1,393)  +0,199834 (1,008)  +0,199834 (0,864) 
Firm size   -0,143471 (1,035)   -0,274073 (2,039)**   -0,278956 (1,990)** 
Incorporated firm  +0,092162 (0,726)  +0,055710 (0,456)  +0,102585 (0,809) 
Credit use:       
  New     -0,122768 (0,741)   -0,027364 (0,170) 
  Expansion     -0,066501 (0,424)   -0,040972 (0,271) 
  Replace     -0,233715 (1,190)   -0,178718 (0,912) 
  Unspecific    +0,493027 (2,529)**  +0,586606 (3,055)*** 
Housebank       -0,156234 (0,102) 
Interaction Variables       
  Mutual trust       -0,119712 (0,786) 
  Experience       -0,118255 (0,748) 
 Obligation      +0,100930  (0,780) 
 Information      +0,201656  (1,301) 
  Stability       -0,354942 (2,155)** 
Transaction Variables       
Credit rating  +0,318855 (4,043)***  +0,218709 (2,747)***  +0,256860 (2,961)** 
Collateratization   -0,009730 (4,235)***  -0,007780 (3,260)***   -0,006201 (2,374)** 
Repayment flexibility    +0,291246 (2,545)**  +0,320277 (2,695)*** 
Duration:      
  First contract     -0,014506 (0,070)  +0,004387 (0,018) 
  < 2   years    +0,030651 (0,143)   -0,062478 (0,259) 
  2 - 6 years    +0,054372 (0,215)  +0,064507 (0,296) 
  7-10 years    +0,043450 (0,223)  +0,047280 (0,193) 
Duration of loan processing     -0,002847 (1,185)   -0,002009 (0,770) 
Cost of loan processing    +0,281627 (1,864)*  +0,275141 (1,839)* 
Cross-Selling     -0,215478 (1,396)   -0,238644 (1,493) 
Control Variables       
West German firm   -0,365775 (2,036)**   -0,528843 (3,066)   -0,517522 (2,854)*** 
Bank type   -0,007319 (0,055)   -0,054975 (0,412)   -0,027339 (0,192) 
Management skill   -0,267220 (2,116)**   -0,281651 (2,305)**   -0,282958 (2,203)** 
Production Industry  +0,081270 (0,414)  +0,085292 (0,459)  +0,091670 (0,480) 
Trade Industry  +0,157632 (0,736)  +0,064939 (0,316)  +0,048535 (0,226) 
Service Industry  +0,203305 (0,800)  +0,264055 (1,095)  +0,373245 (1,493) 
Building Industry  +0,025323 (0,112)   -0,139207 (0,642)   -0,105108 (0,466) 
Constant  +1,560719 (3,782)***  +2,024136 (4,436)***  1,776681 (3,646)*** 
Adj. R-square  0,15976  0,22644  0,24130 
F-Value 5,49548***  4,65320***  4,06763*** 
N 357  357  357 
Note: *, **, ***: Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively  
Table 4 
Determinants of Loan Pricing: The Role of Housebanks 
Dependent Variable: Interest rate 
OLS Regression Coefficients (t-Value) 
  Total Cases  Housebank  Non-Housebank 
Firm Characteristics:       
Age:  < 2 years  +0,257492 (1,073)  +0,400584 (1,115)  +0,403679 (1,111) 
  2 - 6 years  +0,371031 (1,725)*  +0,220756 (0,682)  +0,651807 (1,867)* 
  7 - 10 years  +0,199834 (0,864)  +0,330150 (1,006)  +0,174910 (0,468) 
Firm size   -0,278956 (1,990)**   -0,081139 (0,305)   -0,242680 (1,329) 
Incorporated firm  +0,102585 (0,809)  +0,213581 (0,982)  +0,092217 (0,547) 
Credit use:       
  New   -0,027364 (0,170)   -0,165372 (0,564)   -0,175965 (0,814) 
  Expansion   -0,040972 (0,271)   -0,220613 (0,894)   -0,049070 (0,233) 
  Replace   -0,178718 (0,912)   -0,061231 (0,173)   -0,380971 (1,474) 
  Unspecific  +0,586606 (3,055)***  +0,285620 (0,929)  +0,389727 (1,434) 
Interaction Variables       
  Mutual trust   -0,119712 (0,786)   -0,552250 (2,063)**  +0,030475 (0,145) 
  Experience   -0,118255 (0,748)   -0,195472 (0,749)  +0,172574 (0,953) 
  Obligation  +0,100930 (0,780)  +0,105262 (0,588)  +0,129118 (0,574) 
  Information  +0,201656 (1,301)  +0,858025 (2,595)***   -0,160838 (0,800) 
  Stability   -0,354942 (2,155)**   -0,394584 (1,021)   -0,215204 (1,060) 
Transaction Variables       
Credit rating  +0,256860 (2,961)**  +0,481319 (3,218)***  +0,305090 (2,663)*** 
Collateralization   -0,006201 (2,374)**   -0,005672 (1,290)   -0,007637 (2,003)** 
Repayment flexibility  +0,320277 (2,695)***  +0,389059 (1,972)*  +0,149874 (0,890) 
Duration:      
  First contract  +0,004387 (0,018)  +0,117530 (0,343)   -0,351552 (0,866) 
  < 2   years   -0,062478 (0,259)   -0,415190 (1,193)  +0,199163 (0,530) 
  2 - 6 years  +0,064507 (0,296)  +0,313083 (0,948)   -0,237888 (0,684) 
  7-10 years  +0,047280 (0,193)   -0,057454 (0,147)  +0,002368 (0,006) 
Duration of loan processing   -0,002009 (0,770)  +0,001031 (0,224)   -0,003751 (1,067) 
Costs of loan processing  +0,275141 (1,839)*  +0,185786 (0,724)  +0,311362 (1,583) 
Cross-selling   -0,238644 (1,493)   -0,048275 (0,148)   -0,490172 (2,389)** 
Control Variables       
West German firm   -0,517522 (2,854)***   -0,180875 (0,598)   -0,500301 (2,070)** 
Bank type   -0,027339 (0,192)   -0,332311 (1,452)  +0,227993 (1,156) 
Management skill   -0,282958 (2,203)**   -0,460263 (2,159)**   -0,010254 (0,052) 
Production Industry  +0,091670 (0,480)  +0,028706 (0,092)   -0,038919 (0,141) 
Trade Industry  +0,048535 (0,226)   -0,099450 (0,309)  +0,252557 (0,786) 
Service Industry  +0,373245 (1,493)  +0,330813 (0,656)  +0,326759 (0,982) 
Building Industry   -0,105108 (0,466)   -0,123509 (0,349)   -0,172700 (0,524) 
Constant  1,776681 (3,646)***  +0,846556 (1,023)  +2,126955 (3,168)*** 
Adj. R-square  0,24130  0,30929  0,26891 
F-Value 4,06763***  2,70448***  3,34925*** 
N 357  205  143 
Note: *, **, ***: Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively 
Differences between the number of data in the three columns are due to missing values of 
some variables.  
Table 5 
Determinants of Loan Pricing: The Role of Firm Age 
Dependent Variable: Interest rate 
OLS Regression Coefficients (t-Value) 
  < 2 years  2-6 years   7-10 years   > 10 years 
Firm  Characteristics:      
Firm size  -0,361570 (2,359)**   -0,217482 (1,497   -0,409479 
(2,706)*** 
 -0,165250 (0,736) 
Incorporated firm  +0,209024 (1,567)  +0,145554 (1,150)  +0,101729 (0,749)  +0,147023 (0,680) 
Credit  use:      
  New  +0,025039 (0,157)  +0,057871 (0,361)  +0,057069 (0,342)   -0,190532 (0,700) 
  Expansion  +0,022049 (0,129)  +0,008151 (0,052)  +0,061706 (0,388)   -0,164298 (0,633) 
  Replace   -0,162949 (0,791)   -0,039613 (0,215)   -0,103561 (0,502)   -0,664864 (1,827)* 







Housebank   -0,101172 (0,648)   -0,355203 (2,353)**  -0,072326 (0,464)   -0,043322 (0,185) 
Interaction  Variables      
  Mutual trust  +0,019440 (0,114)  -0,184214 (1,199)   -0,156389 (0,953)   -0,084544 (0,320) 
  Experience   -0,199654 (1,200)   -0,111448 (0,702)   -0,122297 (0,727)   -0,194935 (0,689) 
  Obligation  +0,101716 (0,717)  +0,182419 (1,426)  +0,086174 (0,620)  +0,096996 (0,422) 
 Information +0,1678707  (0,993)  +0,474012 
(3,063)*** 
+0,128019 (0,768)  +0,199609 (0,776) 
 Stability    -0,295484  (1,660)*   -0,490034 
(2,949)*** 
- 0,351631 (1,996)**   -0,281763 (1,000) 
Transaction  Variables      
Credit rating  +0,300171 
(3,223)*** 
+0,174729 (2,039)** +0,230564 (2,480)**  +0,351295 (2,219)**
Collateralization   -0,005748 (2,040)**  -0,003793 (1,392)   -0,004613 (1,633)  -0,006070 (1,364) 





Duration:      
  First contract  +0,022634 (0,102)  +0,088222 (0,425)  +0,026772 (0,119)  +0,372300 (0,544) 
  < 2   years  +0,194679 (0,819)  +0,235339 (1,136)  +0,208190 (0,985)  +0,086995 (0,128) 
  2 - 6 years   -  +0,181076 (0,955)  +0,346116 (2,008)**  +0,144411 (0,201) 
  7-10 years   -    -  +0,045071 (0,155)  +0,352397 (0,526) 
Duration of loan processing   -0,002452 (0,836)  +0,001632 (0,617)   -0,001407 (0,525)   -0,006085 (1,373) 
Costs of loan processing  +0,235125 (1,434)  +0,177668 (1,188)  +0,207010 (1,284)   +0,491040 
(2,018)** 
Cross-selling   -0,174028 (1,033)   -0,227552 (1,416)   -0,214326 (1,268)   -0,386916 (1,317) 
Control  Variables      
West German firm   -0,720530 
(3,795)*** 
 -0,428957 (1,927)**  -0,674588 
(3,597)*** 
 -0,498317 (2,121)**
Bank type   -0,056098 (0,359)   -0,122289 (0,848)   -0,055072 (0,362)   -0,074684 (0,326) 
Management skill   -0,298389 (2,168)**  -0,312493 (2,317)**  -0,245301 (1,724)*   -0,431054 (1,981)**
Production Industry  +0,076171 (0,371)  +0,011944 (0,060)  +0,103836 (0,516)  +0,099063 (0,300) 
Trade Industry  +0,036119 (0,157)  +0,056110 (0,257)   -0,011224 (0,050)   -0,069524 (0,183) 
Service Industry  +0,631477 (2,239)  +0,375277 (1,469)  +0,234343 (0,860)  +0,400391 (0,980) 








Adj.  R-square  0,22707 0,26020 0,23458 0,19250 
F-Value  3,82903*** 3,59536*** 3,77933*** 2,30703*** 
N  51 99 48 159 
  
Table 6 
Descriptive Statistics for Regression Variables 
 





Firm Characteristics:       
Age:  < 2     years  0,137 (49)  357   
  2 - 6   years  0,286 (103)  357   
  7 - 10 years  0,123 (44)  357   
Firm size  0,678 (242)  357   
Incorporated firm  0,560 (200)  357   
Credit use*:       
 New  0,322  (115)  357   
 Expansion  0,384  (137)  357   
 Replace  0,115  (41)  357   
 Refunding  0,171  (61)  357   
 Unspecific  0,275  (98)  357   
Interaction Variables       
Housebank 0,589  (203)  348   
Experience 0,397  (137)  345   
Obligation 0,343  (121)  344   
Information 0,232  (80)  345   
Stability 0,351  (125)  357   
Mutual Trust  0,467 (189)  355   
Transaction Variables       
Repayment flexibility  0,496 (173)  349   
Credit rating***  2,5  356  2 (1;5) 
Collateralization (in%)  56,80  356  60 (0;100) 
Duration:      
  First contract  0,180 (67)  357   
  < 2 years  0,143 (51)  357   
  2 - 6 Years  0,275 (99)  357   
Duration of loan processing  14,2  353  8 (1,180) 
Costs of loan processing  0,585 (191)  352   
Cross-selling 0,826  (295)  357   
Control Variables       
West German firm  0,801 (286)  357   
Bank type  0,435 (155)  356   
Management skill  0,465 (166)  357   
Production Industry  0,381 (137)  357   
Trade Industry  0,213 (77)  357   
Service Industry  0,112 (40)  357   
Building Industry  0,179 (64)  357   
Others 0,104  (38)  357   
Note: * Mean = in percent above the median;  
** Cases with dummy = 1 
*** multiple answers allowed  
Table 7 
Housebanks and Non-Housebanks 
Descriptive Statistics; Chi-Square-Test (dummy, ordinal), T-Test (metric), 
 
  Non-Housebank  Housebank 
  Mean (Cases/SD)  Median  Mean (Cases/SD)  Median  
Interest margin  1,6914 (SD:1,179)   1,200  1,5145 (SD: 1,154)  1,100 
Credit Refuse***  0,019 (4)    0,159 (27)    
Age classes         
  < 2     years  0,140 (20)    0,127 (26)   
  2 - 6   years*  0,231 (33)    0,322 (66)   
  7 - 10 years  0,140 (20)    0,111 (23)   
  > 10   years  0,483 (69)    0,421 (90)   
Credit use:         
  New  0,301 (43)    0,332 (68)   
  Expansion***  0,287 (41)    0,444 (91)   
  Replace  0,105 (15)    0,127 (26)   
  Refunding  0,189 (27)    0,161 (33)   
  Unspecific***  0,331 (46)    0,179 (36)   
Credit rating classes*    3    3 
  1  0,077  (11)    0,107  (22)   
  2  0,415  (59)    0,424  (90)   
  3  0,408  (58)    0,376  (77)   
  4  0,085  (12)    0,088  (18)   
  5  0,014  (2)    0,005  (1)   
Collateralization(***)  44,965 (SD:31,4)  50  64,375 (SD: 23,2)  65 
Duration of Relationship    3    3 
  First contract***  0,280 (40)    0,145 (29)   
  < 2    years  0,140 (20)    0,146 (30)   
  2 - 6  years  0,245 (35)    0,307 (63)   
  7 -10 years  0,105 (15)    0,088 (18)   
  > 10  years***  0,231 (33)    0,314 (65)   
Duration of loan processing  13,7 (SD: 23,3)  7  14,5 (SD:23,8)  10 
Cross-selling  0,867 (124)    0,790 (162)   
West German firm  0,811 (116)    0,791 (163)   
Bank type***         
  Big private bank  0,643 (92)    0,294 (60)   
  Savings bank  0,203 (29)    0,371 (76)   
  Cooperative bank  0,154 (22)    0,335 (69)   
Industry        
  Production Industry  0,349 (50)    0,410 (84)   
  Trade Industry**  0,280 (40)    0,161 (33)   
  Service Industry**  0,007 (10)    0,137 (28)   
  Building Industry  0,161 (23)    0,195 (40)   
  Other Industries  0,088 (18)    0,126 (18)   
Cases 143    205     
*, **, ***: Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively (Chi-Square-Test) 
(*), (**), (***):Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively (two-tailed t-test) 
SD: Standard deviation 